Larry Raithaus v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc. : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Larry Raithaus v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc. :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.; M. Douglas Bayly, Esq.; Christensen, Jensen and Powell; Attorneys for
Defendants.
LeRoy S. Axland, Esq.; Michael W. Homer, Esq.; Fred R. Silvester, Esq.; Suitter Axland Arstrong and
Hanson; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Larry Raithaus v. Saab-Scania of America, Inc., No. 860208.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1097








IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SAAB-SCANIA OF AMERICA, INC., 
a Connecticut corporation; 
and SAAB-SCANIA AB, a Swedish 
corporation, KEN GARFF FOREIGN 
CARS, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
Caise No. 860208 
Priority No. 13b 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D. 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Date of Final Judgment 3/20/86 
Case No. C 82-9672 
LeROY S. AXLAND, Esq. (#0153) 
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq. (#1535) 
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862) 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys far Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South wdst Temple 
Salt Lake Cijty, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS, Esq. (#1582) 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY, Esq. (#0251) 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
900 Koarns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
FILED 
AUG271986 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
IN THE SUPREME COURjT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D., ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
SAAB-SCANIA OF AMERICA, INC., ] 
a Connecticut corporation; ] 
and SAAB-SCANIA AB, a Swedish ] 
corporation, KEN GARFF FOREIGN ] 
CARS, a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendants. ] 
i Case No. 860208 
) Priority No. 13b 
i 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF OF LARRY RAITHAUS, M.D. 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
Date of Final Judgment 3/?0/86 
Case No. C 82-9672 
LeROY S. AXLAND, Esq. (#0153) 
MICHAEL W. HOMER, Esq. (#1535) 
FRED R. SILVESTER, Esq. (#3862) 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
700 Clark Learning Office Center 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
L. RICH HUMPHERYS, Esq. (#1582) 
M. DOUGLAS BAYLY, Esq. (#0251) 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
900 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL . „ 









THE LIMITATION PERIODS SET FORTH 
IN THE UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 
SECTION 78-15-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(REPL. VOL. 9A, 1977), APPLIES TO 
TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS . * 
ACCEPTED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION RENDER THE "TWO-YEAR" STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION 
A. Where There is Doubt Regarding 
Which of Two Arguably Applicable 
Statute of Limitations to Apply 
in a Particular Case^ the Longer 
of the Two Periods i^ Generally 
Preferred 
B. Should Two Statutes Relating to 
the Same General Subject Matter 
be in Conflict, the More Specific 
of the Two Will Control 
A COURT CAN LOOK TO THE LEGISLATURE'S 
INTENT TO DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY 
OF A STATUTE 
CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' 
POSITION THAT A STATUTE 0|F REPOSE DOES 
NOT EXTEND THE LIMITATION OTHERWISE 









TABLE OF CASES 
Bateman v. Board of Examiners, 
7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958) 
Cadieux v. International Telephone 
and Telegraph Corporation, 
593 F.2d 142 (1st Cir. 1979) 
Comptroller of Virginia ex rel. 
Virginia Military Institute v. King, 
232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 1977) 11 
Drug, Cosmetic & Beauty Trades Service, Iftc. v. McFate, 
14 Ariz. App. 7, 480 P.2d 30 (1971). . . , 
Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 
326 F.Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla. 1971) 11 
Hardinge Company, Inc. v. Eimco Corporation, 
1 Utah 2d 320, 266 P.2d 494 (1954) . . . ^ 
Juab County Department of Public Welfare y. Summers, 
19 Utah 2d 49, 426 P.2d 1 (1967) . . . .
 t 
Matheson v. Crockett, 
577 P.2d 948 (Utah 1978) 
Matthews v. Travellers Indemnity Insurance Company, 
245 Ark. 247, 432 S.W. 2d 485 (1968) . . 4 
Millett v. Clark Clinic Corporation, 
609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980) 
Nebraska Mil-Nic, Inc. v. Hall County, 
187 Neb. 656, 193 N.W.2d 450 (1972) 
O'Connor v. Altus, 
67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1975) . 11 
Orr v. Lewis Central School District, 
298 N.W. 2d 256 (Iowa 1980) 
Pacific Intermountain Express Company 
v. State Tax Commission, 
7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957) 
- ii -
Payne v. Far-Mar-Companyr 
612 S.W.2d 54 (Mo. App. 1981) 9 
Rammell v. Smith, 
560 P. 2d 1108 (Utah 1977)
 k 8 
Smith v. American Radiator and 
Standard Sanitary Corporation, 
38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.2d 462 (D.N.C. 1978) 11,12 
STATUTES CITED 
U.C.A., Section 78-12-1 (1953, as amended) 4,6 
10 
U.C.A., Section 78-12-28 (1953, as amende^) 1 
U.C.A., Section 78-12-28 (2) (1953 , as amended) 1,4 
6,9 
U.C.A., Section 78-15-1 (1953, as amended) 2,5 
U.C.A., Section 78-15-2 (1953, as amended) 2,10 
U.C.A., Section 78-15-2(3) (1953, as amended) 10 
U.C.A., Section 78-15-3 (1953, as amended) 1,4 
U.C.A., Section 78-15-3(1) (1953, as amended) 5,6,9 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The sole issue on defendants' cross-appeal is whether 
the trial court's application of the Product Liability Act's 
statute of limitations in 1983 was appropriate. This is a differ-
ent issue from that raised on plaintiff's appeal from the trial 
court's 1986 order that the Product Liability Act's statute of 
limitations is still the applicable statute of limitations regard-
less of this court's ruling that the Product Liability Act is 
unconstitutional. 
Defendants' cross-appeal states that the issue before 
the court is: 
(1) Did the trial court err when it 
interpreted the Utah Product Liability Act 
statute of repose, Utah Code Annotated, Sec-
tion 78-15-3 (1953) , to be a statute of limi-
tation which extended the two-year limitation 
on wrongful death actions otherwise mandated 
by Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-12-28 
(1953)? 
Stating the issue in this fashion is misleading it suggests that 
the trial court made its determination without considering the 
Utah Products Liability Act statute of limitations as a statute 
of repose• 
The issue before the trial court in 1983 was which of 
two potentially applicable statutes of liftiitations should apply 
to the plaintiff's claim: the general two-year statute of limita-
tion for wrongful death found in § 78-12428(2), Utah Code Ann, 
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(Repl. Vol. 9A, 1977), or the special statute of limitation found 
in the Utah Products Liability Act, § 78-15-1 et seq., Utah Code 
Ann. (Repl. Vol. 9A, 1977) (hereinafter the "Act"). Accordingly, 
the trial court properly found that the Product Liability statute 
of limitation applied "specifically and exclusively to causes 
of action of the type asserted in plaintiff's complaint and is 
applicable to actions to recover damages for wrongful death which 
are based on these causes of action." 
The trial court's determination, as well as the manner 
in which the trial court phrased the issue (which of two statutes 
of limitation were applicable), reflected the explicit intent of 
the legislature, as set forth in §§ 78-15-2 and 3 to create a 
statute of limitations which applied to product liability actions. 
As a result, during the period from 1977, when the Act was enact-
ed, and December, 1985, when this Court held the Act unconstitu-
tional, an injured plaintiff contemplating a product liability 
action in Utah could reasonably look to that section of the Act 
which specified the limitation periods for all product liability 
actions as the applicable timeframe for commencing such an action. 
The trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff's action was 
timely and the Act's six-year limitation period applied was prop-
er. 
The trial court's determination was based on (1) the 
fact that the statute of limitations set forth in the Product 
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Liability Act Specifically included the type of action asserted 
by the plaintiff;
 and (2) general principles of statutory con-
struction led to the conclusion that the Production Liability 
statute or" limitation is the more specific, the Legislature's 
intent to provide limitation periods for all cases where the 
gravamen of th% complaint involved a defective product, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rond^ M. Luther Raithaus died on July 2, 1979 from 
injuries sustained when the Saab automobile she and her husband 
Dr. Larry Raithaus were traveling in, burst into flames after 
driving off the paved highway in Little Cottonwood Canyon, R. 
3-4. The Com^iaint in this action was filed on November 29, 
1982, claiming damages for the death of Rohda M. Luther Raithaus, 
plaintiff's wife# R. 6# The Saab automobile in question was a 
1976 model, R.^# bought by Dr. Raithaus ih February of 1977, R. 
30, 64. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct i:p concluding that the 
statute of limitations contained in the tftah Product Liability 
Act was applicable to this action. Thi^ court's declaration 
that the statut:e was unconstitutional canhot act to deprive the 
plaintiff his day in court. To the extent &n action filed within 
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the then existing limitation period, the period becomes a vested 
component of plaintiff's action which he cannot be constitution-
ally deprived of by a later declaration of unconstitutionality. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LIMITATION PERIODS SET FORTH IN THE 
UTAH PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, SECTION 78-15-3, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (REPL. VOL. 9A, 1977), 
APPLIES TO PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS 
The statute of limitations invoked by defendants, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-28(2), (1977), provides as follows: 
Within two years: . . . (2) An action 
to recover damages for the death of one caused 
by the wrongful act or neglect of another. 
This section is one of the general limitation provisions which 
are collected in Chapter 12 of Title 78 of the Utah Code. The 
first section of Chapter 12 provides an introduction to, and 
governs, the limitation found at § 78-12-28(2). It states: 
Civil actions can be commenced only 
within the periods prescribed in this chapter, 
after the cause of action shall have occurred, 
except where in special cases a different 
limitation is prescribed by statute. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-1 (1977). (Emphasis added.) This product 
liability action is such a special case excluded from the general 
statute of limitation by § 78-12-1. 
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In 1977, the Utah Legislature enacted the Utah Product 
Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et seg. (1977). Its 
title describes the purposes of the Act as follows: 
An act enacting Sections 78+15-1 through 
78-15-6, Utah Code Annotated (1953); relating 
to product liability; creating a Utah Product 
Liability Act; setting forth the purpose 
and intent of the Act; establishing a statute 
of_JJjftiitations for product liability cases 
(1977 Utah Laws ch. 149). 
The special "statute of limitations for product liabil-
ity cases" is found at § 78-15-3(1), Utah\Code Annotated. (Repl. 
Vol. 9A, 1977). it provides, in pertinent part: 
No action shall be brought for the re-
covery of damages for personal jjnjury, death 
or damage to property more thin six years 
after the date of initial purchase for use 
or consumption, or ten years after the date 
of manufacture, of a product, where that 
action is based upon, or arises out of, any 
of the following: 
(a) Breach of any implied warranties; 
t(b) Defects in design, inspection, 
testing or manufacture; 
(c) Failure to warn; 
(d) Failure to properly instruct in 
the use of a product; or 
(e) Any other alleged defect or failure 




Section 78-12-1 and the Product Liability Act, when 
read in conjunction, unambiguously establish an exception to 
the general two-year statute of limitations if claims arise from 
the use of a defective product. 
POINT II 
ACCEPTED RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
RENDER THE "TWO-YEAR11 STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION 
Not only does the clear language of Title 78 compel a 
finding that the limitation found at § 78-15-3(1), rather than 
that set forth at § 78-12-28(2), applies to this action, but 
accepted canons of statutory construction, when applied to this 
case, require application of the Utah Product Liability Act's 
statute of limitations. 
A. Where There is Doubt Regarding Which 
of Two Arguably Applicable Statute of 
Limitations to Apply in a Particular 
Case, the Longer of the Two Periods 
is Generally Preferred. 
In Hardinge Company, Inc. v. Eimco Corporation, 1 Utah 
2d 320, 266 P. 2d 494 (1954) , this Court was asked to decide wheth-
er the three-year limitation found at § 78-12-26(3) or the six-
year limitation found at § 78-12-23 was applicable. The plaintiff 
could have stated a claim either for money paid under mistake, 
or for breach of contract. In addressing this question, the 
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Court noted that "[t]he principal question on appeal . . . is 
which limitation applies." (266 P.2d at 495). In resolving 
this dispute, this Court held: 
If a substantial doubt exists as to 
which is the applicable statute of limita-
tions, the longer rather than ' the shorter 
period of limitations is to be preferred. 
(266 P.2d at 496). 
The basis for this canon of Statutory construction 
was explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Juab County Department 
of Public Welfare v. Summers, 19 Utah 2d ^9, 426 P.2d 1 (1967). 
In Juab, the Court reiterated the above quoted language from 
Hardinae, supra, and explained that "the law does not look with 
favor upon the defeating of a just obligation if it can be prop-
erly avoided." (426 P.2d at 3). Courts in neighboring juris-
dictions have similarly adopted this ba$ic rule of statutory 
construction. See, e.g.. Orr v. Lewis Central School District. 
298 N.W. 2d 256 (Iowa 1980); Drug, Cosmetib & Beauty Trades Ser-
vice. Inc. v. McFate, 14 Ariz. App. 7, 480 p.2d 30 (1971); Matth-
ews v. Travellers Indemnity Insurance Company. 245 Ark. 247, 
432 S.W. 2d 485 (1968). 
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B. Should Two Statutes Relating to 
the Same General Subject Matter 
be in Conflict, the More Specific 
of the Two Will Control, 
In Millett v, Clark Clinic Corporation, 609 P.2d 934 
(Utah 1980), The Utah Supreme Court considered the effect of an 
apparent conflict between two statutory provisions relating to 
statutes of limitation and adopted the following rule of con-
struction in order to fulfill the legislatures intent: 
. . . where the operation of two statu-
tory provisions is in conflict, that provision 
which is more specific in its application 
will govern over that which is more general. 
(609 P.2d at 936). This Court has uniformly applied the rule. 
See, Rammell v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1977) ; Bateman v. 
Board of Examiners, 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381 (1958) ; and Paci-
fic Intermountain Express Company v. State Tax Commission, 7 
Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957). 
The greater specificity of a given statute is compelling 
when enacted after the adoption of the more general statute. 
Bateman v. Board of Examiners, supra; Pacific Intermountain Ex-
press Company v. State Tax Commission, supra. Courts have uni-
formly held that where a later-enacted statute of limitations 
provides a different limitation period for actions based on a 
particular legal theory and, addresses the subject with greater 
specificity, the more recent enactment must be regarded as an 
exception to, or qualification of, the prior statute. (E.g., 
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Payne v. Far-Mar-Companv, 612 S.W.2d 54 (|lo. App. 1981) (limita-
tion provision applicable to actions for breach of any contract 
for sale constituted exception to prior statute imposing different 
limitation on all actions based on written contracts); Nebraska 
Mil-Nic. Inc. v. Hall County. 187 Neb. 656^ 193 N.W.2d 450 (1972) 
(special statute of limitations controls over a general statute 
because the special statute more properly expresses the legis-
lative will). 
The limitation provision invoke^ by defendants, which 
was adopted in 1951, applies generally to actions "to recover 
damages for the death of one caused by the Wrongful act or neglect 
of another." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(2)1 (1977). The statute 
of limitations found in the Product Liability Act applied speci-
fically to any action "for the recovery of damages for . . . death 
. . . where that action is based upon, or arises out of, [b]reach 
of any implied warranties," "[d]efects ifo design, inspection, 
testing or manufacture," "[f]ailure to warn," "[f]ailure to prop-
erly instruct in the use of a product," on "OD^Y other alleged 
defect or failure of whatsoever kind or nature in relation to a 
product." Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3(1) (1977). This limitation 
period, as the language of the Act indicates, applies only to a 
specific class of actions which claims, although previously in-
cluded within the general language of § 7$-12-28(2), have been 
excluded from the latter's limitation by legislative action. 
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The limitation provision contained in the Utah Product Liability 
Act, which expressly and specifically applies to actions seeking 
damages for death caused by the use of defective products, must 
be regarded as an exception to the prior general wrongful death 
statute of limitations. 
POINT III 
A COURT CAN LOOK TO THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT TO 
DETERMINE THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE 
A Court can look to the legislature's intent to deter-
mine the applicability of a statute, Matheson v. Crockett, 577 
P.2d 948 (Utah 1978) . The language of the Utah Product Liability 
Act, when read in conjunction with § 78-12-1, unambiguously re-
quires application of the six-year statute of limitations of 
the Act to the plaintiff's action. In the instant case, the 
intent of the legislature, as set forth in § 78-15-2, is wholly 
consistent with the language of the Act and with application of 
the six-year limitation period in this action. § 78-15-2(3), 
provides: 
In enacting this Act, it is the purpose 
of the legislature to provide a reasonable 
time within which actions may be commenced 
against manufacturers, while limiting the 
time to a specific period for which product 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably 
and accurately calculated; and to provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early 
evaluation and settlement of claims. 
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POINT IV 
CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' 
POSITION THAT A STATUTE OF REPOSE 
DOES NOT EXTEND THE LIMITATION OTHERWISE 
PROVIDED BY A STATUTE OF LIMITATION 
Defendants, in their cross-appeal, cite several cases 
which purportedly stand for the propositlion that a statute of 
repose does not extend the limitation otherwise provided by the 
applicable statute of 1imitation• Grisftom v. North American 
Aviation, Inc. , 326 F.Supp. 465 (M.D. Flia. 1971); O'Connor v. 
Altus. 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 545 (N.J. 1975); Cadieux v. Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, 593 Fc2d 142 (1st 
Cir. 1979) ; Comptroller of Virginia ex rfel. Virginia Military 
Institute v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 19*^7); Smith v. American 
Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporatiqn, 38 N.C. App. 457, 
248 S.E.2d 462 (D.N.C. 1978) (overruled on other grounds). How-
ever, these cases may be distinguished fr^m that of the plain-
tiff's case, since the statutes under which they were decided 
differ from the Utah Product Liability Ac*^ . Cadieux v. Inter-
national Telephone and Telegraph Corporatipn, 593 F.2d 142 (1st 
Cir. 1979) , for example, involved interpretation of a Rhode Island 
wrongful death statute with a two-year statute of limitation 
that had been amended. The amendment retained the two-year limi-
tation and provided a ten-year period after the sale of a product 
as an additional limitation for commencemeilit of an action. The 
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Rhode Island legislature intended that the two limitation periods 
should operate in conjunction with each other rather than sepa-
rately as in the case at hand. 
Another case, O'Connor v. Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 335 A.2d 
547 (N.J. 1975), involved statutes that apply to recovery of 
damages in tort, contract or otherwise for bodily injury or wrong-
ful death arising out of improvements to real property. The 
New Jersey statute, N.J.S.A. 2A: 14-1.1, specifically refers to 
tort, contract or other types of action, thereby implying that 
any other statutes which apply to these causes of action, in-
cluding statutes of limitation, should be used in conjunction 
with Section 2A: 14-1.1. See also. Smith v. American Radiator 
and Standard Sanitary Corporation, 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E. 
462 (D.N.C. 1978) (interpreting a South Carolina statute which 
is identical in all material respects to the New Jersey statute) ; 
Grissom v. North American Aviation, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 465 (M.D. 
Fla. 1971) (construing a Florida statute that provides a 12-year 
limitation period within which actions might be brought against 
architects or professional engineers); Comptroller of Virginia 
ex rel. Virginia Military Institute v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895 (Va. 
1977) (construing a Virginia statute which sets outside limits 
on tort or contract actions against architects for improper de-
sign) . None of these cases involved product liability actions 
brought under a separate product liability statute that set out 
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its own period of limitation. Thus, statues from other states 
contrast with the Utah Product Liability Act which establishes 
a limitation period for all actions based on breach of implied 
warranties; defects in design, testing, inspection or manufacture; 
failure to warn; failure to properly instruct in the use of a 
product and any other defect or failure in ^  product. The limita-
tions period in the Utah Act became a vested component upon plain-
tiff's filing of the action (see plaintiff's Brief on Appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court was correct iili concluding that the 
statute of limitations contained in the Ijtah Product Liability 
Act was applicable to this action. This court's declaration 
that the statute was unconstitutional cannot act to deprive the 
plaintiff his day in Court. To the extent &n action filed within 
the then existing limitation period, the period becomes a vested 
component of plaintiff's action which he cannot be constitution-
ally deprived of by a later declaration of unconstitutionality. 
Therefore, plaintiff requests this Court reinstate the action 
and direct the trial court to proceed with a| trial on the merits. 
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